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Is Copyright Property?

ADAM MOSSOFF*

In his article, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of
Copyright Law,1 Richard Epstein offers a Lockean justification for
intellectual property rights generally, and copyright specifically.
Epstein’s thesis is profoundly important and basic: All legal property
rights, whether tangible or intangible, are born of important policy
considerations. In proving this, he surveys the justification and
development of property rights in the West, and reveals with great
clarity that many of the traditional (and tread-worn) policy issues
concerning the definition of tangible property rights are eerily similar to
the issues implicated in the now-raging debate concerning the definition
of intellectual property rights, especially copyright in digital content.
Alas, Epstein’s insight may fall on deaf ears. For the peer-to-peer
(P2P) file swappers and their advocates in think tanks and academia, the
problem with Epstein’s thesis is reflected in the terms of his title: Liberty
versus Property. For these people, the Internet’s unique or exceptional
characteristics—whether in its end-to-end (E2E) infrastructure or in its
transaction-cost-lowering effects—changes the fundamental policy
equation.2 Accordingly, these “Internet exceptionalists”3 have come to
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1. 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005).
2. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 23–48 (2001) (discussing the
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view the debate in terms of only one side of this juxtaposition—liberty.4
In their minds, “digital copyright,” and “intellectual property” generally,
is an oxymoron.5 The digital realm is about freedom—in every respect,
from its architecture, to its ethos, to its implications for politics6 (as
Californians discovered with a successful recall election in September
2003 spawned by websites providing information on signing and
collecting petitions for the recall campaign7). They maintain that the
architecture of the Internet, its E2E nature, and noting some of the regulatory
implications of this structural design); John Peter Barlow, Cyberspace Declaration of
Independence (Feb. 8, 1996), at http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html
(declaring that, on the Internet, “whatever the human mind may create can be reproduced
and distributed infinitely at no cost”).
3. This is a protean term that does not have a precise definition. It covers a wide
variety of positions, including individuals advocating for (1) the abolition of intellectual
property rights in digital content, see, e.g., John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas,
WIRED (March 1993), and (2) the rolling back of intellectual property rights generally
given what we have learned about the nature of innovative work in our new digital
world, see, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, On My Bad Grades in Software: An Appeal, at
http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/cooper.shtml (last visited Feb. 20, 2005) (proposing
a ten-year copyright term for software code). Given his advocacy rhetoric, see infra note
26 and accompanying text, Lessig is sometimes thought to support position (1), but he
ardently maintains that he is in favor of some intellectual property rights in digital
content—within the “balancing” framework that he proposes as the policy foundation for
these rights. See infra note 30 and accompanying text. Further complicating efforts at
defining Internet exceptionalism, the digital world continues to evolve in unforeseen
ways (who could have predicted the rise of the blog in 2003 and 2004 to such social and
political prominence), and thus the views of the various players continue to morph
accordingly. As used in this Essay, therefore, this term is limited to the positions
described herein.
4. Barlow, supra note 2 (declaring that the denizens of the Internet “must declare
our virtual selves immune to [state] sovereignty” and that “[w]e will spread ourselves
across the Planet so that no one can arrest our thoughts”).
5. Dan Gillmor, a somewhat obstreperous activist in favor of Internet
exceptionalism, has remarked:
The copyright industry talks about “intellectual property”—a grossly
misleading expression that turns history and logic upside down.
Property, by tradition and law, is physical. The idea of “intellectual
property” is a fairly recent invention by the people who believe they should be
able to own ideas, and totally control their use, with the help of a compliant
Congress.
Dan Gillmor, We Must Engage the Copyright Debate, at http://www.siliconvalley.com/
mld/siliconvalley/3842508.htm (Aug. 11, 2002). But see infra note 38 (discussing factual
inaccuracy of Gillmor’s criticism).
6. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Internet Under Siege, FOREIGN POLICY
(Nov.–Dec. 2001), at 56 (discussing how the architecture and ethos of the Internet
provide a unique opportunity for promoting creativity and political liberty).
7. In a spring 2003 article on Governor Gray Davis’s declining popularity, the
New York Times reported on the early recall effort by “a small group of antitax crusaders
and conservative Republicans,” and it also noted—ominously, in retrospect—that “the
recall effort has been largely centered on drumming up support on the Internet and
conservative talk radio shows . . . .” Dean E. Murphy, California Recall Effort Clouds
Davis’s Future, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2003, at 28; see also http://www.rescuecalifornia.
com/petitions/ (“Recall of Failed Governor Joseph Graham Davis: Petitions and
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enforcement of so-called “traditional” property entitlements on the
Internet is, at best, misplaced, and, at worst, dangerous to the freedom
and creative potential of this new realm.8 Their despair in response to
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,9 the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act,10 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Eldred v.
Ashcroft11 is palpable.12 Siva Vaidhyanathan decries extending copyright
Signatures Collection Succeeded—Recall Vote Succeeded”) (2004); http://www.
recallgraydavis.com/ (recall campaign supported by former California Assemblyman
Howard Kaloogian) (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
8. See, e.g., Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyright as Cudgel, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Aug. 2, 2002, at http://chronicle.com/free/v48/i47/47b00701.htm (condemning “the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act as reckless, poorly thought out, and with gravely
censorious consequences”).
9. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827–2828 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302
and 304 by extending copyrights terms, both prospectively and retroactively).
10. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) extended copyright protections to the Internet in two important
ways. First, it defined secondary liability standards for ISPs, Usenet hosts and websites
when their services are used by copyright infringers. See 17 U.S.C. § 512. Second, it
proscribed programmers from accessing digital code that was copyrighted or expressed a
copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
11. 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of the Copyright Term
Extension Act).
12. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, The Copyright Cage, LEGAL AFFAIRS (July–Aug. 2003),
at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/July-August-2003/feature_zittrain_julaug03.html (noting
that the author “hate[s] the effects of copyright on a digital revolution . . . . [and] hate[s] that
creativity is metered and parceled to its last ounce of profit”); David Post, Some Thoughts on
Copyright Extension, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, at http://volokh.com/2003_01_19
_volokh_archive.html (posted Jan. 19, 2003) (noting that he “was disappointed in the Court’s
decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft,” that the DMCA “is a disgrace,” and that “the politics of
copyright is deeply, profoundly, screwed up”); Jack M. Balkin, Mickey in Chains, Part II, or
Why the Court Got it Wrong in Eldred v. Ashcroft, BALKINIZATION, at http://balkin.
blogspot.com/2003_01_12_balkin_archive.html (posted Jan. 15, 2003) (stating that Eldred “is
simply a disastrous opinion for free speech, and the Court should be ashamed of the shoddy job
it’s done”); Dan Gillmor, Hacking, Hijacking Our Rights, SILICONVALLEY.COM, at http://www.
mercurynews.com/mld/siliconvalley/business/columnists/dan_gillmor/3751660.htm?1c
(July 27, 2002) (stating that copyright forces are winning and that “[t]hese are
discouraging times”); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 192 (2001) (noting that “the
future is murky” and that she has become “more cynical”).
However, recent court successes by defendants fending off plaintiffs’ copyright
infringement claims have given Internet exceptionalists some grounds to be more
optimistic at the close of 2004. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting DMCA claim raised against
company that provided means for consumers to reuse toner cartridges); Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting vicarious
liability claims against P2P file swapping network providers, Grokster, KaZaa, and
Morpheus), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting DMCA claim by garage door
manufacturer against manufacturer of universal remote control); Online Policy Group v.
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terms and applying copyright to novel forms of expression in digital
media because this is “unjustifiably locking up content that deserves to
be free.”13 Or, as Lawrence Lessig bluntly puts it: “Ours is less and less
a free society.”14
With growing alacrity, the Internet exceptionalists are thus attempting
to frame the public debate solely in terms of freedom, liberty, creativity,
our “common culture,” and the public domain. No one seems to
epitomize this better than the prominent tech commentator and blogger,
Doc Searls, who lamented the Eldred decision, but came away from the
experience having learned an important lesson: The fundamental issue in
the policy debate is neither political nor legal, but “conceptual.”15 Searls
realized that they lost Eldred because proponents of digital copyright—of
copyright generally—have successfully defined their legal entitlements
as property, which makes Searls and others who believe in the “public
domain” and the “commons” sound like they are, well, for lack of a
better term, “Communist.”16 Searls later wrote that they “need to figure
a way around the Property Problem,” because “we lose in the short run
as long as copyright (and, for that matter, patents) are perceived as
simple property. Our challenge is to change that.”17 Some do not even like
the term “commons” because it “itself is a ‘property’ metaphor.”18 “[W]e
must change the terms of the debate,”19 Vaidhyanathan has intoned, and
thus recognize that “[c]opyright should be about policy, not property.”20
Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (rejecting DMCA claim by
Diebold against college students who placed online information concerning potential
problems in Diebold’s computerized voting system); see also Robert P. Merges, A New
Dynanism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 185 (2004) (discussing the
various private ordering mechanisms favoring the public domain that have developed in
response to “the most egregious excesses of the [IP] system”).
13. Siva Vaidhyanathan, After the Copyright Smackdown: What Next?, at
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/01/17/copyright/ (Jan. 17, 2003).
14. Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture, O’REILLY NETWORK, at http://www.oreillynet.
com/lpt/a/2641 (keynote presentation at the Open Source Convention, July 22, 2002).
Lessig repeats this point in his published work, where he posits that increasing controls
over digital technology and copyrighted works present a “constitutional question” that he
phrases as: “Are we, in the digital age, to be a free society?” LESSIG, supra note 2, at 11.
15. Doc Searls, Going Deep, at http://www.aotc.info/archives/000160.html#000160
(last visited Jan. 21, 2003) (copy on file with author).
16. Id.
17. Doc Searls, Saving the Net: Who Owns What?, L INUX J., at http://www.
linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=6989 (July 22, 2003) (emphasis added).
18. Lawrence Lessig, Free the Air, at http://www.lessig.org/blog/archives/
001248.shtml (posted May 31, 2003) (reporting on and expressing agreement with
Yochai Benkler’s position).
19. SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 12 (2001).
20. Id. at 15. This is an omnipresent theme within Vaidhyanathan’s work.
Elsewhere, he has written: “We make a grave mistake when we choose to engage in
discussions of copyright in terms of ‘property.’ Copyright is not about ‘property’ as
commonly understood. It is a specific state-granted monopoly issued for particular
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There are two ways in which one can interpret the Internet
exceptionalists’ complaint about the “Property Problem” and their
injunction that “copyright is policy, not property”: A strong sense and a
weak sense. Before discussing these two senses, though, a brief remark
about the scope of this Essay is in order. This Essay will describe how
the property theory that Epstein explicates in Liberty versus Property
might respond to the specific claims advanced by the Internet
exceptionalists. Accordingly, its purpose is not to offer a complete
account of why digital copyright is property. That is not possible in an
Essay that offers only an abbreviated, descriptive account of one aspect
of the debate, especially given the admittedly heretical nature of these
remarks to the Internet exceptionalists and their web-surfing allies. The
justification of the property theory itself is in Epstein’s article, and in
other articles already written or yet to be produced.21
In its strong sense, the Internet exceptionalists’ thesis quickly devolves
into a truism about property rights as such. If it is true—as it must be—that
copyright is policy, then it is equally true that all property rights are
policy. In proving this point in his article, Epstein prefers utilitarian
analysis, and he has spent much of his professional life attempting to
show the ways in which the incremental development of property rights
in the West represents the slow (and unending) march to identify utilitymaximizing rules for our social and political institutions. Yet, even if
one does not wish to jump on the utilitarian train that Epstein is calling
us all aboard, it is easy to see that every tangible property entitlement has
arisen from a crucible of moral, political, and economic analyses, and
thus implicates the same questions about utility, personal dignity, and
freedom that now dominate the debates over digital copyright. The
preeminent property cases that every law student studies in the first year
of law school are exemplars of this basic truth.22
policy reasons.” Vaidhyanathan, supra note 8.
21. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New
Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803 (2001); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright
as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990); Ayn Rand, Patents and
Copyrights, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN IDEAL 130–34 (1967). See also Justin
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988) (discussing, in
part, the justificatory role of labor theories of property for intellectual property
entitlements).
22. See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (discussing
acquisition of title to land by the European settlers from the American Indians); Pierson
v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 174 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (addressing the requirements for claiming
property in wild animals).
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When Internet exceptionalists thus maintain that “[c]opyright is not
about ‘property,’ . . . [i]t is a specific state-granted monopoly issued for
particular policy reasons,”23 then they must also maintain that no legal
rights in any tangible things are property. Everything that everyone
owns—tangible or otherwise—represents only state-granted legal
monopolies issued to individuals for particular policy reasons. As
Epstein rightly points out, at a fundamental level of analysis, “property
and monopoly . . . are the same side of the same coin.”24 Accordingly, in
this strong sense, the Internet exceptionalists’ complaint about extending
copyright to digital media is, at the same time, neither informative nor
instructive—unless one’s goal is to restructure universally the concepts
and legal rules for all property entitlements in American society.
It is unsurprising then that the Internet exceptionalists’ rhetoric has
produced the politically charged label of Communist. When Dan
Gillmor publishes a webzine article attacking the Eldred decision under
the heading, “Supreme Court Endorses Copyright Theft,” writing that
the Supreme Court decision has sanctioned “a brazen heist,” and asking
his readers, “Who got robbed? You did. I did,” one hears the rallying
call: Copyright is theft!25 When one hears Lessig’s similar complaint
that the Copyright Term Extension Act is a “theft of our common
culture,”26 one hears again the rallying call: Copyright is theft! As Doc
Searls aptly points out, it is no surprise that Gillmor’s and Lessig’s
readers hear the echoes of the nineteenth-century socialists’ selfdescribed battle cry: “Property is theft!”27
We are not compelled, however, to adopt only the strong sense of the
Internet exceptionalists’ rhetoric. There is also a weak sense to their
claim that copyright is policy, not property; namely, that copyright is
fundamentally different from tangible property, and, as best illustrated in
the context of digital media, does not deserve the same moral or legal
status typically afforded to our more traditional property entitlements.
This is hardly a radical claim, and there is substantial evidentiary
support for this proposition in the American copyright and patent
scheme. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated: The constitutional
grant of power to Congress to protect copyrights and patents “reflects a
balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of
monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance
23. Vaidhyanathan, supra note 8.
24. Epstein, supra note 1, at 23.
25. Dan Gillmor, Supreme Court Endorses Copyright Theft, SILICONVALLEY.COM, at
http://weblog.siliconvalley.com/column/dangillmor/archives/000730.shtml (Jan. 15, 2003).
26. Lessig, supra note 14.
27. PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 13 (Donald R. Kelley &
Bonnie G. Smith eds., trans., 1994) (1840).
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in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”28
From such judicial and legislative statements, the Internet exceptionalists
make an important change to Epstein’s juxtaposition. It is not “liberty
versus property,” but rather “liberty versus monopoly.” And, they
conclude, the stifling effects of extending the copyright monopoly to
digital media substantially outweigh the negligible benefit (if any) of
promoting innovation. Here, the Internet exceptionalists adopt the same
utilitarian metric employed by Epstein, arguing that “[b]efore the
[copyright] monopoly should be permitted, there must be reason to
believe it will do some good—for society, and not just for the monopoly
Reflecting his desire that we interpret the Internet
holders.”29
exceptionalists’ claims in this weak sense, Lessig asks (somewhat
rhetorically but obviously in frustration): “Does calling for balance make
one a communist?”30
In this weak sense, therefore, the claim that “copyright is policy, not
property,” is simply shorthand for the proposition that we must achieve
and maintain balance in the utility calculation of “liberty vs. copyright
monopoly.” There are two supporting premises for this proposition that
Internet exceptionalists sometimes intermingle: The first is historical,
and the second is analytical. On the historical side, Internet exceptionalists
maintain that copyrights and other intellectual property rights have
always been viewed as monopolies issued by the state according to a
strict utility calculus. Again, this is not a radical claim. Thomas
Jefferson, an avowed defender of the natural right to property, believed
that “[i]nventions . . . cannot, in nature, be a subject of property,” and that
“an exclusive right” is granted to inventors by “[s]ociety” solely “as an
28. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that the “monopoly privileges that
Congress may authorize” under the Constitution serve “an important public purpose” in
“motivat[ing] the creative activity of authors and inventors”); Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (noting, in the context of patent law, that the Constitution precludes
Congress from “enlarg[ing] the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation,
advancement or social benefit gained thereby”).
29. Lawrence Lessig, May the Source Be With You, WIRED (Dec. 2001), at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9.12/lessig.html (arguing against the protection of
software code under copyright “monopolies”).
30. Lawrence Lessig, The Limits of Copyright, INDUSTRY STANDARD (June 19,
2000), at http://www.lessig.org/content/standard/0,1902,16071,00.html. More recently,
Lessig writes: “The property right that is copyright is no longer the balanced right that it
was, or was intended to be. The property right that is copyright has become unbalanced,
tilted toward an extreme.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 173 (2004).
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encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility . . . .”31
The historical record, however, is not as one-sided as the Internet
exceptionalists would like us to believe. Since the enactment of the Statute
of Anne in 1709,32 the first modern copyright law, the justification for
copyright has comprised two general normative theories. The first is
utilitarianism, and the second is natural rights theory, particularly the
labor theory of property and the social contract doctrine at the core of
John Locke’s political philosophy.33 The labor theory of property usually is
given short shrift by modern copyright scholars, but it certainly played a
justificatory role in the historical copyright debates. As Representative
Gulian Verplanck stated in defense of a bill that became the Copyright
Act of 1831: “[T]he work of an author was the result of his own labor. It
was a right of property existing before the law of copyrights had been
made.”34 State laws protecting intellectual property rights prior to the
1787 Federal Convention also reflected a Lockean influence. New
Hampshire, to name but one example, enacted legislation to protect
copyrights and other forms of intellectual property because “there being
no property more peculiarly a man’s own than that which is produced by
the labour of his mind.”35 Moreover, the evolution and creation of new
types of intellectual property rights in the nineteenth century, such as
trademarks and trade secrets, followed the contours of a labor theory of
property.36 The initial definition and protection of trade secrets as
property entitlements, for instance, derived its justification from the
courts’ belief that such rights were similar to other property rights born
of valuable labor and already protected by the law.37
31. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Isaac McPherson (August 13, 1813), in THE LIFE
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 576–77 (Adrienne Koch & William
Peden eds., 1993).
32. 8 Ann., c. 19 (1709) (Eng.).
33. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (noting the “complementary”
relationship between the utilitarian and labor-desert theories in copyright law).
34. Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copyright’s Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2d
37, 40 (2002) (quoting 7 REG. DEB. 424 (1831)).
35. Act for Encouragement of Literature and Genius (1783), in COPYRIGHT
ENACTMENTS: LAWS PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT
8 (1973). Massachusetts and Rhode Island adopted the exact same language in their own
respective copyright statutes in 1783. Id. at 4, 9; see also Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor
Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155, 164 (2002) (explaining how New Hampshire’s
Act for the Encouragement of Literature reflected a Lockean proposition that was of
normative import to Americans in the late eighteenth century).
36. See Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45
ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 415–24 (2003) (discussing the genesis in the nineteenth century of
trade secret and trademark rights as intellectual property doctrines).
37. See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 457–58 (1868) (protecting trade
secrets as nonexclusive intellectual property rights because of their similarity to “good
will,” which is protected by the law when a “man establishes a business and makes it
valuable by his skill and attention”).
AND
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It is a profound oversimplification to declare that intellectual property
rights, including copyright, have always been conceived solely as
“monopolies” doled out by the state according to a utilitarian calculus
that weighs social and scientific progress against the stifling effects and
deadweight losses attributable to typical government-created monopolies.
The proposition that “copyright is a property right” is not a novel form
of political rhetoric invented by Jack Valenti sometime in the last twenty
years in order to advance the interests of Hollywood before Congress.38
In casting the history of intellectual property rights in this way, an
interesting and multifaceted historical record is flattened out in order to
create a picture of what the Internet exceptionalists believe copyright
and other intellectual property rights should be today. As one critic has
noted, this is not history, but rather the construction of a myth.39
Why the Internet exceptionalists retell the history of intellectual
property rights in this way reflects their underlying conception of the
nature of these rights. As noted earlier, they believe that intellectual
property rights generally are merely monopolies. In other words,
copyrights and patents comprise only monopoly privileges handed out to
authors and inventors by Congress under the constitutional grant of
authority to Congress that it “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.”40 This is the analytical side of the weak interpretation of
“copyright is policy, not property,” and, once again, this is hardly a
radical claim, as reflected in the contemporary Supreme Court’s repeated
references to copyright and patent rights as “monopolies.”41

38. Valenti was President and CEO of the Motion Picture Association of America.
See Frank Field, FURDLOG, at http://msl1.mit.edu/furdlog/index.php?wl_mode=more&
wl_eid=310 (last updated June 12, 2003) (criticizing the claim that copyright is property
as merely a modern “political agenda”); see also Gillmor, supra note 5 (offering a
similar criticism of “intellectual property” as merely a self-interested political ploy by
the modern “copyright industry”).
These criticisms are factually inaccurate. Copyrights were identified as “property” in
state statutes in the early 1780s. See supra note 35. In 1824, Daniel Webster proposed
patent legislation in the House of Representatives, declaring in his floor speech that “he
need not argue that the right of the inventor is a high property; it is the fruit of his
mind—it belongs to him more than any other property . . . and he ought to be protected
in the enjoyment of it.” 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1824). Patents were later identified
as “industrial property,” a precursor to “intellectual property,” in the Paris Convention of
1883, which was ratified by the U.S. Senate and signed by President Grover Cleveland in
1887. See Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 25 Stat. 1372 (1883).
39. See generally Nachbar, supra note 34.
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
41. See supra note 28 (citing cases).
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This definition of intellectual property solely in terms of a utilitybased monopoly, as opposed to a type of property, is actually the result
of an impoverished concept of property that has dominated our political
discourse in the twentieth century. At the turn of the twentieth century,
legal scholars and judges redefined “property” as a set of “social
relations”42—what later became known as a “bundle” of rights.43 With
this narrow focus on the purely social role of property, it was but a short
step to focus on the one social right in the bundle of rights that
constitutes our modern understanding of property: The right to exclude.
In fact, the Supreme Court would eventually declare that the right to
exclude is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property.”44 As one prominent property
scholar put it recently, the right to exclude is the sine qua non of a
property right.45
This narrow definition of property as the right to exclude works well
for tangible property entitlements, but it fails miserably to capture our
intangible property entitlements. In the world of tangible property, there
are fences and boundary lines that physically exclude non-owners.
There is also ontological exclusivity: Two people cannot occupy the
same piece of land at the same time but in different ways. Two farmers
who each attempted to till the same piece of soil—one trying to grow
corn and the other wheat—would soon come to blows as to who may do
what with the land.46 Accordingly, the fact of physical exclusion serves
as an objective baseline for defining the right to exclude.
For intellectual property rights, the problem with reducing property to
the right to exclude is readily apparent. There is no natural exclusion of
intellectual property entitlements. Inventions, books, and computer code
can be copied willy-nilly without taking the original physical product
away from the inventor or author. (In the economist’s terms, intellectual
property is a “public good” given its nonrivalrous and nonexhaustive
characteristics.)47 Unlike that one acre of land over which the two
farmers are pummeling each other, the P2P file swapper can trade music
42. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 361–
63 (1954).
43. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
44. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
45. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730,
730 (1998).
46. As one natural rights theorist succinctly put it: A conflict over goods “shows
the falsity of the old saying: ‘Mine and thine are the causes of all wars.’ Rather it is that
‘mine and thine’ were introduced to avoid wars.” SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE
NATURAE ET GENTIUM 541 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934) (1688) (the
title translates as On the Law of Nature and Nations).
47. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 62–63 (3d ed. 2004).
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files without impinging on the original author’s right to listen to his own
song or on another person’s right to listen to the copy that he rightfully
has purchased. The right to exclude in intellectual property entitlements
exists by legal fiat. It is solely a creation of the law with no natural
counterpart in the actual facts of how people interact in the world. Thus,
the exclusive rights granted to copyright and patent holders appear
arbitrary—they are only legal figments of our collective social imagination.
And these rights certainly do not fit the definition of property, which, as
we are constantly reminded, is naturally exclusive.
When one throws into this policy mix the unique characteristics of
digital technology, especially the Internet, it becomes clear that intellectual
property “monopolies” should be restrained in our new digital world.
There is no natural exclusion in the digital domain, and the creation of
“artificial” barriers simply restricts free movement and stifles decisionmaking. Even if there were some type of objective baseline justifying
exclusive copyright entitlements before the invention of the Internet,
there certainly is none now. The P2P users of Napster (before its
reincarnation as a pay-per-download MP3 service), and now Morpheus and
KaZaa, cheaply and easily copy files from one to another with nothing
stopping them except their bandwidth allotment and the storage capacity
on their hard drives—or the cease and desist letter from the Recording
Industry Association of America. While bandwidth restrictions are
somehow real to the P2P user, the cease and desist letter is not. And this
makes sense only because people define “property” today solely in terms
of exclusion. Doc Searls is correct: The problem is conceptual, but the
real problem is that we are defining property in such a way that
copyright and other intellectual property entitlements cannot be anything
other than artificial monopolies, enforced at the policy whim of
Congress.
It is at this fundamental level of analysis that Epstein’s article is most
insightful. He reveals that the analytical framework that explains how
physical property rights have been defined applies equally to intellectual
property rights; the difference between the two types of property rights
is not a difference in kind, but only one of degree.48 As with chattels or
fishing rights, when one is faced with a different context, one must
48. See also Solveig Singleton, IP as Conflict Resolution: A Micro View of IP, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 45, 48 (2005) (noting from a utilitarian perspective that the differing
incentives between “physical property and IP” are “not a difference of kind but of
degree”).
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define one’s property rules accordingly. The legal rules that make sense
for dividing up and using farmland should not be applied deductively to
fish or wild game, or vice-versa. This does not mean that these rights are
not property rights. It means that they are only a different type of
property right—but a property right nonetheless. To put it bluntly, if not
in an oversimplified way, digital copyright is to the author and computer
programmer today what fishing rights were to the whalers and fishermen
of yesteryear.49
Although Epstein prefers to recast natural rights theory in solely
consequentialist terms, there is a significant and substantive element of
the theory, particularly the Lockean version preferred by Epstein, which
is not fully captured in this retelling. The preeminent natural rights
theorists—Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, and John Locke—worked
with a concept of property whose roots went far back into the Western
canon, to the ancient Greek philosophers and the Roman lawyers.50 The
principal focus of this tradition was the exact opposite of our
contemporary view of property: They were concerned not only with how
property functioned in complex social and economic relationships, but
how property arose in the first place, and what this told us about the
nature of property as such.51 This explains the focus of these theorists
on the analytical fulcrum creating property entitlements: The acquisition,
labor or creative work that brings something into human possession and
use.52 And this provenance informed the natural rights theorists that the
core or substance of property is the action that one takes to create and
maintain the property.53 Thus, the classic definition of property as the
right to use, possess and dispose of one’s possessions.54
49. See Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881) (discussing rules for resolving two
fishermen’s competing property claims to a whale); see also JAMES M. ACHESON, THE
LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988) (discussing, in part, how lobstermen have created a
system of property rights without reference to the legal system).
50. See generally Mossoff, supra note 36, at 377–95 (discussing the “integrated
theory of property” advanced by Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke, and the dominance of
this theory of property within the Western canon).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. William Blackstone writes:
Property, both in lands and moveables, being thus originally acquired by
the first taker, which taking amounts to a declaration that he intends to
appropriate the thing to his own use, it remains in him, by the principles of
universal law, till such time as he does some other act which shows an
intention to abandon it . . . .
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *9 (emphases added).
54. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 39 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., 1954) (350
B.C.E.) (stating that a thing “is ‘our own’ if it is in our power to dispose of it or keep it”).
In 1625, Grotius approvingly translated Aristotle’s definition as: “The definition of
ownership . . . is to have within one’s power the right to alienation.” HUGO GROTIUS, DE
JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 260 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1625) (the title
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This concept of property dominated the American understanding of
property in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is revealed in the
New Hampshire Supreme Court’s explanation in 1872 that “[i]n a strict
legal sense, land is not ‘property,’ but the subject of property. The term
‘property,’ . . . in its legal signification . . . ‘is the right of any person to
possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of a thing.’”55 Or, as James Madison
wrote in 1792, “property” means more than just “land, or merchandise,
or money,” this concept has a “larger and juster meaning, [as] it
embraces everything to which a man may attach a value and have a
right.”56 Property is the right to acquire, use, and dispose of the things
that one has created through one’s labor. It is this concept of property
that precipitated the virtual truism in American society that every person
has a right to enjoy the fruits of one’s labors.
It is also this concept of property—which focuses on the substantive
relationship between a person and the thing that he has labored upon or
created—that explains and justifies the protection of intellectual property
rights, regardless whether these rights exist in tangible books or computer
code. A person’s right to control the disposition of his creation, and
thereby enjoy the fruits—the profit—of his labors, is central to the legal
definition and protection of property entitlements.57 As the New York
Court of Appeals stated in 1856: “Property is the right of any person to
possess, use, enjoy and dispose of a thing. . . . A man may be deprived
of his property in a chattel, therefore, without its being seized or
physically destroyed, or taken from his possession.”58 In the context of
tangible property rights, the courts have never demanded that a person
be deprived physically of his property as a necessary prerequisite for
finding a violation of property rights. Stealing the fruits of one’s labors
or indirectly interfering with the use of the property is sufficient; in other
translates as The Law of War and Peace). In agreement with the Roman law, Pufendorf
characterizes property as the right to “use, abuse and destroy [a possession] at our
pleasure.” SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO
NATURAL LAW 130 (James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans., 1991) (1673).
55. Eaton v. B. C. & M. R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 511 (1872).
56. James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in THE
MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 186
(Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981).
57. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Ct. App. 1993)
(holding, in part, that a man has a property right in his sperm because he has “decision
making authority as to the use of his sperm for reproduction,” and this control over its
use and disposition is an “interest [that] is sufficient to constitute ‘property’”).
58. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 433 (1856) (emphases added).
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words, it is sufficient that one lose the ability to use, control or dispose
of the values that one has created.59 It is this concept of property that
explains why copyright is in fact property, rather than monopoly
privileges meted out to authors at the leisure of the state’s utility
calculation.
As opposed to the excessively narrow definition of property today, the
concept of property at work in natural rights theory is sufficient in
breadth and scope to explain and justify myriad property entitlements in
a variety of contexts—tangible and intangible. As noted earlier, it
served as the analytical baseline for defining and protecting the new
types of valuable intellectual property that arose during the industrial
revolution, such as trademarks and trade secrets.60 In the context of
copyright, it was unclear at the turn of the century how our legal rules
would apply to the amazing new inventions of the day, such as
phonorecords and player pianos.61 Several decades later, the legal rules
of copyright faced another revolution with the invention of radio and
television.62 With each inventive leap forward, the legal protections
evolve as well, because the author deserves to control the use and
disposition of his property.
The past evolution of copyright law is notable because we are in the
midst of another revolution today—the digital revolution. The impact of
the digital revolution is as far reaching as was the industrial revolution
of the nineteenth century, but it is important to realize that we are still in
the midst of this revolution. It is not yet clear how and in what ways
intellectual property rights should be best protected in the new digital
domain, but the evolution of intellectual property rights is as necessary
today as it was during the industrial revolution. It would be wrong to
condemn outright our early attempts to define copyright entitlements for
digital content, just as it would have been wrong to condemn the early
attempts at defining trademarks or the evolving rules of copyright at the
59. Nuisance doctrine is a long-standing example of this basic principle in
property law. As opposed to trespass, which requires a physical entry on a person’s
property, nuisance requires only that there be a “substantial and unreasonable”
interference with “the use and enjoyment” of one’s property. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS § 13, at 70 (5th ed. 1984).
60. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
61. In 1908, the Supreme Court held that piano rolls used in mechanized piano
players were not copies of the music, because the rolls were not literal reproductions of
the written musical score that could be read by another person. See White-Smith Music
Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908). In 1909, Congress responded to WhiteSmith by extending copyright protection to phonorecords. See H.R. REP. NO. 2222, at 9
(1909). The exclusive right to control the reproduction of copies of copyrighted works in
“phonorecords” is retained in the 1976 Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1995).
62. Copyright owners have the right to control public performances and reproductions
in “motion pictures” and “other audiovisual works.” See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4)–(5).
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end of the nineteenth century. A legal doctrine in transition may be
criticized for its various fits and starts, but the difficulties inherent in the
transition are not sufficient grounds for junking the doctrine itself.63

63. One online petition drafted by Lawrence Lessig, and which is no longer
accessible, called for Congress to roll back copyright protections to those set forth more
than two hundred years ago in the first copyright act of 1790. See Reclaim Copyright Law
Petition to United States Congress, at http://www.petitiononline.com/progress/petition.html
(last visited June 4, 2003) (copy on file with author). In Free Culture, Lessig emphasizes his
point about the extremity of the copyright laws today by comparing them to the
protections secured under the 1790 copyright act. LESSIG, supra note 30, at 130–39 &
170–73.
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